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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jessy C. Berry was charged with grand theft and unlawful possession of a firearm for
taking his grandmother's handgun or possessing her gun knowing it was stolen. Mr. Berry went
to trial, and the district court allowed the State to present evidence of Mr. Berry's violence
against his grandmother before he took her gun and her consequent fear of him. The jury found
Mr. Berry guilty as charged. On appeal, Mr. Berry argues the district court abused its discretion
by allowing this evidence because its minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. He further argues this error was not harmless, and therefore he
respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new
trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On November 22, 2017, Mr. Berry got into an altercation with his grandmother/adoptive
mother, Beverly Berry, at her house. (Tr., p.167, Ls.4-7, p.171, L.9-p.172, L.23; see also
Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI"), p.51.) Mr. Berry had lived there with her in the past,
but he did not live there currently. (Tr., p.167, L.23-p.168, L.8.) Ms. Berry left her home during
the fight, and, when she came back, her gun was gone. (Tr., p.172, Ls.17-19, p.173, L.21-p.174,
L.13.) Twelve days later, on December 4, the police searched Mr. Berry's trailer and found the
gun. (Tr., p.127, Ls.7-14, p.128, L.10-p.130, L.17.) The State charged him with grand theft and
unlawful possession of a firearm. (R., pp.17-19 (second amended information).) For the theft,
the State alleged two means of commission: wrongful taking of the gun or knowing possession
of a stolen gun. (R., p.18.)
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Mr. Berry went to trial. (See R., pp.22-30.) Before jury selection, the district court raised
an issue with the "admissibility of some background information" leading up to the theft.
(Tr., p.21, Ls.19-25.) In an earlier, separate case, a jury had found Mr. Berry guilty of false
imprisonment and battery against Ms. Berry for this altercation on November 22. 1 The district
court assumed the State would want Ms. Berry to testify about this dispute to prove the wrongful
taking theory. (Tr., p.21, L.25-p.22, L.9.) The district court ruled the evidence was relevant for
motive, opportunity, and intent for taking the gun. (Tr., p.22, Ls.11-16, p.22, Ls.22-25.)
However, the district court expressed concern on this evidence's relevancy for the unlawful
possession charge. (Tr., p.22, Ls.16-19.) The State argued the evidence was relevant to both
charges to establish possession, but agreed "to avoid specifics of' the prior crimes. (Tr., p.23,
L.4-p.24, L.19.) Mr. Berry argued the "specifics and details about that encounter wouldn't
necessarily add that much value to the story of the case." (Tr., p.25, Ls.5-7.) Mr. Berry asserted
this minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
(Tr., p.25, Ls.7-12.) Accordingly, Mr. Berry requested the district court exclude this evidence.
(Tr., p.25, Ls.12-14.) The district court allowed the State "some leeway" to present background
information "of where this gun was allegedly taken from, who it belonged to, how Mr. Berry had
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The procedural posture of this case is somewhat complicated because the State initially charged
Mr. Berry with grand theft and unlawful possession of a firearm in a different case, CR-2017585, along with aggravated assault and kidnapping against Ms. Berry for the incident on
November 22. (Tr., p.18, Ls.12-17, p.18, L.25-p.19, L.1; Aug. R., pp.1-3.) This case was
consolidated with another case, CR-18-48, to add a charge of battery against Ms. Berry, which
also occurred on November 22. (Aug. R., pp.5-7.) Later, the district court granted Mr. Berry's
motion to sever the property crimes from the crimes against Ms. Berry. (Tr., p.18, Ls.17-24;
Aug. R., pp.12-14, 20-21, 23.) In CR-2018-585, the State dismissed the charge of aggravated
assault. (See Aug. R., pp.24-25.) Mr. Berry went to trial on the remaining charges of kidnapping
and battery. (Tr., p.18, L.25-p.19, L.4.) The jury found Mr. Berry not guilty of kidnapping, but
guilty of the lesser offense of false imprisonment. (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-4.) The jury also found him
guilty of battery. (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-3.)
2

access to that home on the particular day in question it was alleged to have been taken, and the
evidence that transpired between he and Ms. Berry," but did not allow details of the prior trial,
photographs of Ms. Berry's injuries, or reference to Mr. Berry's convictions for battery and false
imprisonment. (Tr., p.25, L.18-p.26, L.7.) The district court determined "the events of that day .
. . are relevant to why Ms. Berry went to look for her gun" and "to the theory that Mr. Berry
actually took the gun." (Tr., p.26, Ls.8-14.) After this ruling, the district court bifurcated the trial
to proceed on the theft charge first and the unlawful possession charge second. (Tr., p.26, L.17p.27, L.7.)
In opening statements on the theft charge, the prosecutor informed the jury that this case
was "actually about a lot more than the theft of just a handgun. It's about the loss of a sense of
safety and security." (Tr., p.112, Ls.21-23.) The prosecutor explained that the police responded
"to a call related to a domestic situation." (Tr., p.112, L.25-p.113, L.2.) The prosecutor also told
the jury that Ms. Berry would testify, "the defendant came to her home, an argument ensued,"
and "[s]he left her home because of her fear, leaving the defendant in that residence." (Tr., p.114,
Ls.8-10.)
In its case-in-chief, the prosecutor presented evidence of Mr. Berry's violence against
Ms. Berry. Detective Seibert testified that he was "called to assist" another officer "with a
possible battered female." (Tr., p.117, Ls.1-2.) Detective Seibert described Ms. Berry as "visibly
shaken and very upset." (Tr., p.117, L.13.) He also testified that, the next day, he went to her
home to take photographs and find the gun's serial number. (Tr. p.118, Ls.1-6, Ls.14-16.) He
explained that he did not go to her home on November 22 because he "was concerned for her
safety." (Tr., p.118, Ls.17-19.)
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Sergeant Bennett testified that he responded to the call at the emergency room, where
another officer was already with Ms. Berry. (Tr., p.121, L.19-p.122, L.4.) He stated twice that he
was at the hospital. (Tr., p.122, L.14, p.123, Ls.13-14.)
Finally,

Ms. Berry testified that she had to leave her house because of the

incident with Mr. Berry. (Tr., p.166, L.11, p.172, Ls.14-19.) She explained that she left and
locked herself in her neighbor's barn. (Tr., p.173, Ls.1-2.) She further testified that, after
Mr. Berry left, she went back home to get her dog and her purse and left again. (Tr., p.174, L. 1.)
She also testified that her gun was gone when she returned. (Tr., p.174, Ls.2-13.) She explained
that she met with police officers that night and did not return home until the next day.
(Tr., p.174, L.25-p.175, L.7.) Ms. Berry confirmed that "what occurred on that day ... caused
[her] to fear to give him that gun." (Tr., p.196, Ls.18-20.)
In closing argument, the prosecutor repeated to the jury that this case is "about a lot more
than" the theft of Ms. Berry's gun. (Tr., p.214, Ls.23-24.) The prosecutor also argued to the jury
that, on November 22, "she's in such fear, she leaves her house. Is that the person you let borrow
your gun?" (Tr., p.224, Ls.8-10.)
The jury found Mr. Berry guilty of grand theft. (Tr., p.229, Ls.5-17; R., p.32.) The
district court proceeded to the second part of the trial for the unlawful possession charge. (See
Tr., p.232, L.1-p.234, L.6.) The prosecutor presented evidence of Mr. Berry's 2012 felony
conviction for aggravated assault, also against Ms. Berry. (See Tr., p.237, Ls.3-18; State's
Exs.25, 26.) The jury found Mr. Berry guilty for unlawful possession. (Tr., p.250, L.24-p.251,
L.12; R., p.31.)
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The district court sentenced Mr. Berry to ten years, with three years fixed, for grand theft,
and five years, with three years fixed, for unlawful possession of a firearm, to be served
concurrently. (R., pp.33-36.) Mr. Berry timely appealed. (R., pp.37-39.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the State to present unfairly prejudicial
evidence of Mr. Berry's harm to Ms. Berry?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State To Present Unfairly Prejudicial
Evidence Of Mr. Berry's Harm To Ms. Berry

A.

Introduction
Mr. Berry asserts the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State to present

evidence of Mr. Berry's violence against Ms. Berry and her fear of him on the day of the theft.
The district court did not act consistently with the legal standards or exercise reason because this
evidence's minimally probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Because the erroneous admission of this evidence was not harmless, Mr. Berry
respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new
trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court reviews "the district court's determination of whether the probative value of

the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion." State v. Ehrlick, 158
Idaho 900, 907 (2015) (citing State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143 (2008)). To determine
whether the district court abused its discretion, the Court considers four factors:
Whether the trial court: ( 1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

7

C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Legal Standards Or Exercise
Reason Because The Marginally Probative Value Of The Evidence Of Mr. Berry's Harm
To Ms. Berry Was Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice
Relevant evidence is generally admissible. Idaho Rule of Evidence ("I.R.E.") 402.

"Evidence is relevant if it has 'any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."' State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2007) (quoting I.R.E. 401).
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith." I.R.E. 404(b). The prohibition on
other bad acts evidence "has its source in the common law. The common law rule was that the
doing of a criminal act, not part of the issue, is not admissible as evidence of the doing of the
criminal act charged." State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). "This evidence of prior misconduct 'may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident .... " State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8 (2013) (quoting I.R.E. 404(b)).
But, even if bad act evidence is relevant for another purpose, it must be excluded "if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury." I.RE. 403.
Here, Mr. Berry maintains the district court abused its discretion by allowing this prior
bad act evidence of Mr. Berry's harm to Ms. Berry. Specifically, the jury heard testimony that
Ms. Berry was "a possible battered female," "visibly shaken and upset," and went to the hospital
emergency room. (Tr., p.117, Ls.1-2, p.117, L.13, p.121, L.19-p.122, L.4, p.122, L.14, p.123,
Ls.13-14.) The jury also learned she could not return to her home that night due to the police's
safety concerns. (Tr., p.118, Ls.17-19.) In addition, the jury heard testimony from Ms. Berry that
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this "incident" required her to run out of her home, lock herself in neighbor's barn, quickly
return to get her dog and purse after Mr. Berry left, and then not return until the next day.
(Tr., p.172, Ls.14-19, p.173, Ls.1-2, p.174, L.25-p.175, L.7.) Finally, the jury was told that
Ms. Berry would not have given Mr. Berry the gun because she was afraid of him after "what
occurred that day." (Tr., p.196, Ls.18-20.) Mr. Berry argues the district court abused its
discretion by allowing this evidence in two ways: ( 1) the district court did not act consistently
with the applicable legal standards because the district court did not conduct the balancing test
required by I.R.E. 403 and (2) the district court did not exercise reason because, if properly
weighed, the danger of unfair prejudice from this evidence substantially outweighed its probative
value. Each error will be addressed in tum.
First, the district court did not balance the evidence's probative value against its
prejudicial effect. In State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132 (2014), this Court reaffirmed the
requirement that the district court conduct I.R.E. 403 's balancing test on the record. Parker
referenced two earlier cases in which this Court held "the district court must address Rule 403 's
balancing test before excluding evidence." 157 Idaho at 139 (citing State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469
(2010), and State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 241 (2009)). The district court must "address
'whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by one of the considerations listed' in
Rule 403." Id. (citing Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471). The district court's failure to do so is not
consistent with the applicable legal standards and thus an abuse of discretion. Id. As in Parker
and its predecessors, the district court here did not balance the probative value and prejudicial
effect of the evidence of Mr. Berry's harm to Ms. Berry. The district court initially raised this
evidence's admissibility in the relevancy context and, specifically, if Mr. Berry's other bad act
was relevant to prove theft only or both theft and unlawful possession. (Tr., p.21, L.19-p.23,
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L.2.) Mr. Berry did not challenge the evidence's relevancy,2 but he objected under I.R.E. 403.
(Tr., p.24, L.21-p.25, L.4.) Yet, the district court did not discuss its weighing of the probative
value and prejudicial effect. Instead, the district court ruled:
Very well. Well, the court's intent would be to proceed as I've described.
And as far as a pretrial ruling on the 404(b) - 403 issue, the court is going to
allow the State some leeway in presenting that kind of background information of
where this gun was allegedly taken from, who it belonged to, how Mr. Berry had
access to that home on the particular day in question it was alleged to have been
taken, and the events that transpired between he and Ms. Berry, although I don't
think the detail of the prior trial needs to be presented, necessarily, with the
photographs showing the battery injuries and all of those types of things, simply
the interaction that's alleged to have occurred between the two of them. Certainly
will be no reference to him being convicted of a misdemeanor battery or false
imprisonment. That would be inadmissible.
But the events of that day, as the State indicated, are relevant to why
Ms. Berry went to look for her gun. Her testimony that she alleges that it was
there before, I assume -- before and after [verbatim] those events, I think, are
relevant and admissible to the theory that Mr. Berry actually took the gun. The
alternative theory is that he simply possessed it at a later time, knowing or should
have known that it was stolen.
(Tr., p.25, L.15-p.26, L.16 (alteration in original).) While the district court cited "403," the
district court did not conduct the required analysis. The district court did not identify the
prejudicial effect of the jury learning of Mr. Berry's harm to Ms. Berry and whether the danger
of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value. To be sure, the district court
recognized the convictions themselves and photographs were not necessary, but the district court
did not discuss its balancing of the evidence it deemed relevant against its prejudicial effect. "By

2

Mr. Berry does not challenge the relevancy of this evidence because trial counsel only argued
this evidence was inadmissible under I.R.E. 403. Mr. Berry maintains, however, any probative
value is minimal. Mr. Berry's prior bad act against Ms. Berry has minimal relevancy for the
elements of grand theft and, moreover, would not be admissible as purely "background"
information. (Tr., p.25, L.18-p.26, L.7.) See State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 573-74 (2017)
(evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, even those "inescapably connected" to the charged
act, must be relevant under the I.R.E., not simply "context" or "temporally connected" to the
alleged crime).
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failing to conduct the Rule 403 balancing test, the district court did not act consistently within
the applicable legal standards." Parker, 157 Idaho at 139.
Second, assuming the district court's ruling was adequate for I.R.E. 403 's balancing test,
the district court failed to exercise reason when weighed this evidence's probative value, if any,
against the danger of unfair prejudice. "Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision
on an improper basis." State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 870 (Ct. App. 2011). Here, this evidence
of Mr. Berry's violence against Ms. Berry and her fear of him suggests a guilty verdict on the
improper basis of propensity and hence appeals to the passions and prejudices of the jury. The
jury learned Mr. Berry attacked Ms. Berry to the point where she was visibly shaken and upset,
even after she arrived at the hospital emergency room. (Tr., p.117, Ls.1-2, p.117, L.13, p.121,
L.19-p.122, L.4, p.122, L.14, p.123, Ls.13-14.) The jury also learned the officer's safety
concerns were high enough that she could not return home that night. (Tr., p.118, Ls.17-19.) The
jury heard from Ms. Berry herself that she was so scared during Mr. Berry's attack that she ran
out of her house, leaving her dog and her purse, and locked herself in a barn. (Tr., p.172, Ls.1419, p.173, Ls.1-2, p.174, L.25-p.175, L.7.) She also told the jury about her fear of him with her
gun. (Tr., p.196, Ls.18-20.) This evidence of Mr. Berry's bad act against Ms. Berry is
inflammatory and prejudicial. It encourages the jury to convict Mr. Berry because he is "a bad
guy" that terrifies and injuries his elderly grandmother. On balance, it cannot be said that the
evidence's minimal probative value for Mr. Berry's motive, intent, and opportunity to take the
gun substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice attributable to this evidence.
Therefore, the district court did not apply the correct legal standards when it ruled this evidence
was admissible under I.R.E. 403.
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Finally, the State will be unable to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, the district
court’s abuse of discretion in admitting this prejudicial evidence was harmless. The State has the
burden to prove the admission of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11 (2013). “To meet that burden, the State must ‘prove[ ] beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”’ Id. (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010)).
This Court’s inquiry “is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict
would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial
was surely unattributable to the error.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). Here,
the State cannot meet its burden because this bad act evidence had an adverse effect on
Mr. Berry’s presumption of innocence. This evidence informed the jury of his propensity for
violence. Moreover, the prosecutor used this violence as a theme in its case. In its opening
statement, the prosecutor told the jury that this case was “about a lot more than the theft of just a
handgun. It’s about the loss of a sense of safety and security.” (Tr., p.112, Ls.21–23.) The
prosecutor also noted the “domestic situation” and that Ms. Berry “left her home because of her
fear” of Mr. Berry. (Tr., p.112, L.25–p.113, L.2, p.114, Ls.8–10.) The prosecutor then returned
to this theme in closing argument. The prosecutor reminded the jury this case is “about a lot
more than” theft. (Tr., p.214, Ls.23–24.) On rebuttal, the prosecutor reasoned, “she’s in such
fear, she leaves her house. Is that the person you let borrow your gun?” (Tr., p.224, Ls.8–10.) In
light of this prejudicial evidence and the prosecutor’s arguments, Mr. Berry contends the State
will be unable to prove the erroneous admission of this evidence was harmless.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Berry respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand
his case for a new trial.
DATED this 3rd day of July, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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